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Abstract—A large amount of transaction data containing
associations between individuals and sensitive information flows
everyday into data stores. Examples include web queries,
credit card transactions, medical exam records, transit database
records. The serial release of these data to partner institutions
or data analysis centers is a common situation. In this paper we
show that, in most domains, correlations among sensitive values
associated to the same individuals in different releases can be
easily mined, and used to violate users’ privacy by adversaries
observing multiple data releases. We provide a formal model for
privacy attacks based on this sequential background knowledge,
as well as on background knowledge on the probability distri-
bution of sensitive values over different individuals. We show
how sequential background knowledge can be actually obtained
by an adversary, and used to identify with high confidence
the sensitive values associated with an individual. A defense
algorithm based on Jensen-Shannon divergence is proposed,
and extensive experiments show the superiority of the proposed
technique with respect to other applicable solutions. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first work that systematically
investigates the role of sequential background knowledge in serial
release of transaction data.
I. INTRODUCTION
Large amounts of transaction data related to individuals
are continuously acquired, and stored in the repositories of
industry and government institutions. Examples include online
service requests, web queries, credit card transactions, transit
database records, medical exam records. These institutions
often need to repeatedly release new or updated portions
of their data to other partner institutions for different pur-
poses, including distributed processing, participation in inter-
organizational workflows, and data analysis. The medical do-
main is an interesting example: many countries have recently
established centralized data stores that exchange patients’ data
with medical institutions; new records are periodically released
to data analysis centers in non-aggregated form.
A very challenging issue in this scenario is the protection
of users’ privacy, considering that potential adversaries have
access to multiple serial releases and can easily acquire
background knowledge related to the specific domain. This
knowledge includes the fact that certain sequences of values
in subsequent releases are more likely to be observed than
other sequences. For example, it is pretty straightforward to
extract from the medical literature or from a public dataset that
a sequence of medical exam results within a certain time frame
has higher probability to be observed than another sequence.
Related work has either focused on anonymization
techniques dealing with multiple data releases, or on privacy
protection techniques taking into account background
knowledge, but limited to a single data release. We are not
aware of any work taking into account the combination of
these conditions. This case cannot be addressed by simply
combining the two types of techniques mentioned above,
since background knowledge can enable new kinds of
privacy threats on sequential data releases. Extensions of
data anonymization techniques to deal with multiple data
releases have been proposed under different assumptions [1],
[2], [3], [4], [5], [6]. The work that is closest to ours is
probably the one presented in [5], in which sensitive values
are divided in transient values that may freely change with
time, and persistent values that never change. However, the
proposed technique is effective only when the transition
probability among transient values is uniform, and this is
often not the case, with the medical domain being a clear
counterexample. In [6] a technique is proposed to defend
against attacks based on the observation of serial data having
transient sensitive values; however, background knowledge
on transition probabilities is not considered in that work.
On the contrary, our privacy preserving technique captures
non-uniform transition probabilities. Our running example
in Section II shows that the anonymizations proposed in
related works are not effective when an adversary can
obtain background knowledge on the transition probabilities.
Techniques considering background knowledge have also been
proposed, and they can be classified according to two main
categories: a) models based on logic assertions and rules [7];
and b) models based on probabilistic tools [8], [9]. However,
these techniques are devised for a single release of the data,
and, as it is shown in Section VI, they are ineffective when
an adversary having background knowledge on sequences of
sensitive values may observe multiple releases.
In this paper we formally model privacy attacks based
on background knowledge extended to serial data releases.
We present a new probabilistic defense technique taking into
account possible adversary’s background knowledge and how
he can revise it each time new data are released. Similarly to
other anonymization techniques, our method is based on the
generalization of quasi-identifier (QI) attributes, but general-
ization is performed with a new goal: minimizing the differ-
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TABLE I
ORIGINAL AND GENERALIZED TRANSACTION DATA AT THE FIRST AND SECOND RELEASE (FIRST AND SECOND WEEK, RESPECTIVELY)
(a) Original transaction data at time τ1
Name Age Gender Zip Ex-res
Alice 51 F 12030 MAM-pos
Betty 52 F 12030 CX-neg
Carol 51 F 12031 CX-pos
Doris 52 F 12031 BS-neg
(b) Generalized transaction data: 1st release
QI-group Age Gender Zip Ex-res
1 [51,52] F 12030 MAM-pos
1 [51,52] F 12030 CX-neg
2 [51,52] F 12031 CX-pos
2 [51,52] F 12031 BS-neg
(c) Original transaction data at time τ2
Name Age Gender Zip Ex-res
Alice 51 F 12030 BCM-pos
Carol 51 F 12031 PNE-pos
Elisa 51 F 12044 MAM-neg
Fran 51 F 12045 CX-neg
Grace 51 F 12040 CX-pos
(d) Generalized transaction data: 2nd release
QI-group Age Gender Zip Ex-res
3 51 F 1203* BCM-pos
3 51 F 1203* PNE-pos
4 51 F 1204* MAM-neg
4 51 F 1204* CX-neg
4 51 F 1204* CX-pos
ence among sensitive values probability distributions within
each QI-group, while considering the knowledge revision
process. Jensen-Shannon divergence is used as a measure of
similarity. We consider different methods and accuracy levels
for the extraction of background knowledge, and we show
that this defense is effective under different combinations of
the knowledge of the adversary and the defender.
Contributions and paper outline. The contributions of this
paper can be summarized as follows:
(i) We model privacy attacks on sequential data release based
on background knowledge about the probability distributions
of sensitive values and sequences of sensitive values. We show
that current anonymization techniques are not resistant to these
privacy attacks.
(ii) We propose JS-reduce as a new probabilistic defense
technique based on Jensen-Shannon divergence.
(iii) Through an experimental evaluation on a large dataset,
we show the effectiveness of our defense under different
methods used to extract background knowledge; Our results
also show that JS-reduce provides a very good trade-off
between achieved privacy and data utility.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section II, the privacy
problem is presented through an example in the medical do-
main that illustrates the privacy attacks enabled by background
knowledge, and the inadequacy of state of the art techniques.
In Section III we formally model the privacy attack, as well as
the considered forms of background knowledge. In Section IV
we show how an adversary can actually extract background
knowledge, and revise his knowledge in order to perform
the attack. In Section V we propose our JS-reduce defense
algorithm that is experimentally evaluated in Section VI.
Section VII concludes the paper.
II. MOTIVATING SCENARIO
In this section we focus on a specific scenario in the medical
domain to illustrate the privacy attacks enabled by background
knowledge on sequences of sensitive values. The example also
shows the inadequacy of state of the art techniques, and serves
as a running example for the rest of the paper.
We consider the case of transaction data representing the
results of medical exams taken by patients, and the need
to periodically release these transactions for data analysis1.
Each released view contains one tuple for each patient who
performed an exam during the week preceding the publication.
We assume that data are published weekly. For the sake of
simplicity, we also assume that each user cannot perform more
than one exam per week; hence, no more than one tuple per
user can appear in the same view. Each generalized tuple
includes the age, gender and zip code of the patient, as well
as the performed exam together with its result. We refer to
this latter data, represented by the multivalue attribute Ex-
res, as exam result2. We denote as positive (pos) a result
that reveals something anomalous; negative (neg) otherwise.
The attribute Ex-res is considered the sensitive attribute, while
the other attributes play the role of quasi-identifiers (QI),
since they may be used, joined with external information,
to restrict the set of candidate respondents. We consider the
case in which the adversary’s background knowledge includes
both sensitive values background knowledge (BKsv) and
sequential background knowledge (BKseq). Intuitively, BKsv
regards the probability of performing an exam with a given
result based on data such as patient’s gender, age, and ZIP
code; e.g., “middle-aged females have a sensible probability
to undergo a mammography with a positive result (MAM-
pos), while teenagers do not”. BKseq regards the probability
of a patient’s exam result given the previous exam results.
For instance, “when the mammography signals a possible
malignancy (MAM-pos) for patient r, there is high probability
that a blood sample of r examined within a month would
detect a breast cancer marker (BCM-pos)”. A simple form of
BKseq is reported in Table II(b); in particular, the first row in
the table represents the above statement, where the probability
of the event is set to 0.6. As we show in Section IV-A, both
1We consider analysis that require individual transactions; i.e., no aggrega-
tion is allowed.
2MAM = mammography, CX = chest X-ray, BCM = breast cancer marker,
PNE = pneumonia
TABLE II
ADVERSARY’S BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE
(a) Sensitive values background knowledge at τ1
Name Age Gender Zip Ex-res BKsv
Alice 51 F 12030 MAM-pos 0.002
Betty 52 F 12030 MAM-pos 0.002
Alice 51 F 12030 CX-neg 0.05
Betty 52 F 12030 CX-neg 0.05
Carol 51 F 12031 CX-pos 0.0003
Doris 52 F 12031 CX-pos 0.0003
Carol 51 F 12031 BS-neg 0.2
Doris 52 F 12031 BS-neg 0.2
Alice 51 F 12030 BCM-pos 0.001
(b) Sequential background knowledge
Ex-res at τ1 Ex-res at τ2 p˜(sτ2 |sτ1 )
MAM-pos BCM-pos 0.6
CX-neg BCM-pos 0.02
CX-pos BCM-pos 0.02
BS-neg BCM-pos 0.02
MAM-pos PNE-pos 0.02
CX-neg PNE-pos 0.08
CX-pos PNE-pos 0.6
BS-neg PNE-pos 0.02
sequential and sensitive values background knowledge can
be easily acquired, either through the scientific literature or
from the data. We name posterior knowledge (PKsv) at τi
the adversary’s confidence about the exam results of tuples
respondents after observing the data released at time τi (e.g.,
“The probability that Alice is the respondent of a tuple with
Ex-res = MAM-pos released at τ1 is 0.5”).
Consider the original transaction data at time τ1 (first
week) and τ2 (second week) shown in Tables I(a) and I(c),
respectively, and the corresponding generalized transaction
data in Tables I(b) and I(d). Note that these generalized views
satisfy state of the art techniques for privacy preservation.
In particular, they satisfy l-diversity [10] with l = 2, m-
invariance [1] with m = 2, as well as the privacy properties
proposed in [4], [5], [11]. However, we show that the release
of these views can lead to a serious privacy threat. Consider
tuples released at τ1 belonging to QI-group 1, having private
values MAM-pos and CX-neg, whose possible respondents are
Alice and Betty. Since Alice and Betty are almost the same
age, and live in the same area, the adversary cannot exploit
BKsv (reported in Table II(a)) to infer whether Alice or
Betty is the respondent of the tuple with private value MAM-
pos. Hence, his posterior knowledge after having observed
tuples released at τ1 states that, both for Alice and Betty, the
probability of being the respondent of one tuple with private
value MAM-pos is the same of being the respondent of one
tuple with private value CX-neg, i.e., 0.5. Analogously, Carol
and Doris have equal probability of being the respondent of
one tuple with private value CX-pos and of one with private
value BS-neg.
Now, consider tuples released at τ2 (in Table I(d)) belonging
to QI-group 3, having private values BCM-pos and PNE-
pos, whose possible respondents are Alice and Carol. Since
Alice and Carol are the same age, and live in very close
areas, once again the adversary cannot exploit BKsv to infer
whether Alice’s private value is BCM-pos and Carol’s one is
PNE-pos, or vice-versa. However, the adversary may exploit
PKsv at τ1 and BKseq to derive a new kind of knowledge,
which we name revised sensitive values background knowledge
(RBKsv) at τ2. This knowledge represents the revision of
sensitive values background knowledge computed based on
the history of released views, and on sequential background
knowledge. The actual method for computing RBKsv is
shown in Section IV; here we give an intuition of the adversary
reasoning. Since the exam result of Alice at τ1 is either
MAM-pos or CX-neg, and the one at τ2 is either BCM-pos
or PNE-pos, 4 possible sequences of sensitive values about
Alice exist. Among these sequences, according to BKseq ,
the one having MAM-pos at τ1 and BCM-pos at τ2 is more
probable than the others, since a positive mammography result
is frequently followed by a positive breast cancer marker test.
Analogously, among the possible sequences regarding Carol,
the most probable is the one having CX-pos at τ1 and PNE-
pos at τ2. Through this kind of reasoning the adversary revises
his sensitive values background knowledge, associating high
confidence to the fact that at τ2 Alice is positive to breast
cancer markers, while Carol has pneumonia. Hence, based on
RBKsv , the adversary can assign with high confidence the
correct sensitive values to Alice and Carol.
III. MODELLING ATTACKS BASED ON BACKGROUND AND
REVISED KNOWLEDGE
In this section we formally model privacy attacks based on
background and revised knowledge available to an adversary.
A. Problem definition
We denote by Vi a view on the original transaction data at
time τi, and by V ∗i the generalization of Vi released by the data
publisher. We denote by H∗j = 〈V ∗1 , V ∗2 , . . . , V ∗j 〉 a history
of released generalized views. We assume that the schema
remains unchanged throughout the release history, and we
partition the view columns into a set Aqi = {A1, A2, . . . , Am}
of quasi-identifier attributes, and into a single private attribute
S. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the domain of
each quasi-identifier attribute is numeric, but our notions and
techniques can be easily extended to categorical attributes.
Given a tuple t in a view and an attribute A in its schema,
t[A] is the projection of tuple t onto A.
Views are generalized by a generalization function G()
that removes possible explicit identifiers from the original
tuples, and generalizes the quasi-identifiers. Tuples in V ∗j are
partitioned into QI-groups; i.e., sets of tuples having the same
values for their quasi-identifier attributes. Even if we consider
generalization-based anonymity, both our attack model and
defense method can be seamlessly applied to bucketization-
based techniques.
At each release of a view V ∗j , the goal of an adversary
is to reconstruct, with a certain degree of confidence, the
sensitive association between the identity of a respondent of
a tuple t in V ∗j and her sensitive value t[S]. The adversary
model considered in this paper is based on the following
assumptions:
◦ The generalization function G() is publicly known.
◦ The adversary may have external information about re-
spondents’ personal data. For example, for each QI-group
Q, the adversary may know its set of respondents.
◦ The adversary may observe a history H∗j of anonymized
views.
◦ The adversary may have background knowledge on sen-
sitive values BKsv and BKseq as formally defined in
Sections III-B and III-C, respectively.
Note that the first two assumptions are shared by most work on
anonymity. As illustrated in Section I, the third and the fourth
(limited to BKsv) have also been considered by related work
but not in combination. Finally, BKseq is original to this work.
B. Sensitive values background knowledge (BKsv)
Sensitive values background knowledge represents the a-
priori probability of associating an individual to a sensitive
value. BKsv is modeled according to the following definition.
Definition 1: The sensitive values background knowledge is
a function BKsv : R → Υ, where R is the set of possible
respondents’ identities, and
Υ = {(p1, . . . , pn) |
∑
1≤i≤n
pi = 1 (0 ≤ pi ≤ 1)}
is the set of possible probability distributions of S, where
D[S] = {s1, s2, . . . , sn}.
For example, if r ∈ R is a possible respondent of a tuple
in a released view, BKsv(r) returns, for each sensitive value
sj ∈ D[S], the probability pj of r being actually associated
with sj .
C. Sequential background knowledge (BKseq)
We model the sensitive value referring to a respondent r
by means of the discrete random variable S having values in
D[S]. Hence, sequential background knowledge is a function
that returns the probability distribution of S at τj given a
sequence Λ = 〈s1, s2, . . . , sj−1〉 of past observations at T =
〈τ1, τ2, . . . , τj−1〉.
Definition 2: The sequential background knowledge is a
function BKseq : Λ× T ×R× T → Υ, where Λ is the set
of possible sequences of past observations of a respondent’s
sensitive values, T is the set of possible sequences of time
instants at which the observations were taken, R is the set of
respondents’ identities, T is the set of possible time instants,
and Υ is the set of possible probability distributions of S.
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Fig. 1. Adversary’s inference mechanisms
For example, if r ∈ R is a possible respondent of a tuple
in a released view, and the adversary knows that r has been
associated with values s1, and s2 at past instants τ1, τ2,
respectively, then BKseq returns the probability pj of r being
associated with sj at τ3, for each possible sensitive value sj .
D. Posterior (PKsv) and revised sensitive values background
knowledge (RBKsv)
As intuitively described in the running example of Sec-
tion II, posterior knowledge at τi represents the adversary’s
confidence about the association between a respondent and
sensitive values after the observation of view V ∗i . For the sake
of readability, we denote PKsv at τi by PKsvi .
Definition 3: The posterior knowledge is a function PKsv :
R×T → Υ, where R is the set of respondents’ identities, T
is the set of possible time instants, and Υ is the set of possible
probability distributions of S.
A method to compute PKsv is described in Section IV-B.
After observing view V ∗j−1, an adversary may exploit pos-
terior knowledge at τ1, τ2, . . ., τj−1, together with sequential
background knowledge BKseq , to derive new information
about the probability distribution of S at τj . We call this
information revised sensitive values background knowledge at
τj (denoted as RBKsvj ); it is essentially the revision of sensi-
tive values background knowledge due to the observation of a
history of released tuples. RBKsvj can be used by an adversary
to calculate posterior knowledge after the observation of V ∗j .
The revised sensitive values background knowledge is a
function RBKsv having the same domain and co-domain
as function PKsv defined in Definition 3. The method to
compute RBKsv is described in Section IV-C.
E. The privacy attack
The inference method adopted by an adversary to re-
construct the sensitive association is depicted in Figure 1.
The adversary obtains sensitive values background knowledge
BKsv , as well as sequential background knowledge BKseq ,
using one of the techniques explained in Section IV-A. When
the first view V ∗1 is released at time τ1, the adversary computes
posterior knowledge PKsv1 based on V
∗
1 and on BK
sv; a
method for posterior knowledge computation is presented in
Section IV-B. Then, the adversary computes revised sensitive
values background knowledge RBKsv2 , based on PK
sv
1 and
on sequential background knowledge BKseq . A technique for
knowledge revision is illustrated in Section IV-C. Hence, when
view V ∗2 is released, the adversary computes PK
sv
2 based on
V ∗2 and on RBK
sv
2 . Then, the knowledge revision cycle con-
tinues with the computation of RBKsv3 based on PK
sv
2 and
BKseq , and so on. When V ∗i includes a tuple of respondent r,
and no tuples of r appeared in H∗i−1, RBKsv(r, τi) cannot be
computed, since no historical information about r’s tuples is
available; in this case BKsv is used instead of RBKsv(r, τi).
IV. KNOWLEDGE EXTRACTION AND REVISION
In this section we illustrate how an adversary may obtain
background knowledge, and use it to reconstruct the associa-
tion between respondents of released tuples and their sensitive
values.
A. Extracting background knowledge
Intuitively, the more accurate is the adversary’s background
knowledge (i.e., close to the underlying process that generated
the data), the more effective will be his attack. Background
knowledge can be obtained using different methods, depending
on the available data, and on the data domain.
The problem of extracting sensitive values background
knowledge based on a corpus of available data has been
thoroughly studied, and effective techniques are available (e.g.,
the ones proposed in [7], [8], [9]). Hence, in the rest of this
paper we assume that the adversary extracts BKsv using one
of the existing methods. However, existing privacy-preserving
techniques do not consider the extraction of BKseq . For
this reason, we illustrate how this knowledge can actually be
obtained.
◦ Incrementally extracting BKseq from the data to be re-
leased. One of the methods proposed to compute the
background knowledge that an adversary may obtain is
to extract it from the same data that are going to be
generalized and released [7], [9]. At the time of writing,
these techniques are limited to the calculation of BKsv .
However, based on a sequence Hi of original views,
sequential pattern mining (SPM) methods [12] can be
used to calculate a function IE-BKseq that approximates
the exact BKseq . That function is incrementally refined
as long as new original views are available. A number
of different SPM techniques have been proposed in the
last years for different application domains (e.g., [13],
[14], [15], among many others). Hence, the choice of
the most appropriate SPM algorithm strongly depends on
the domain of the data. In Section VI-C we illustrate the
algorithm we adopt to calculate IE-BKseq for the sake
of our experiments. Of course, this technique can be used
by the defender only, since we assume that the adversary
cannot observe original views.
◦ Mining BKseq from an available corpus of data. Even
if an adversary cannot observe the original data, he may
apply SPM methods to a corpus of external data from
the same domain to calculate a function SPM-BKseq that
approximates the exact BKseq .
◦ Exploiting domain knowledge. In many cases it is possible
to exploit domain knowledge extracted from the scientific
literature. For instance, in the medical domain, a number
of surveys have been published, which report accurate
statistics about the probability of disease evolution with
time (e.g., [16], [17], [18], [19], just to name a few). Given
this knowledge, it is easy to design a function DK-BKseq ,
which approximates the exact BKseq .
B. Computing posterior knowledge
In order to compute PKsvi , it is possible to reason consid-
ering a QI-group at a time. In particular, in our case, given
a QI-group Q having R as the set of respondents, a possible
configuration is a function c : Q → R, i.e., a one-to-one
correspondence between elements in Q ∈ Q and elements
in R ∈ R. Given a possible configuration c, for each tuple
t ∈ Q we say that “r is the respondent of t in the possible
configuration c” if c(t) = r.
Example 1: Consider Table I(d) released at τ2 in our run-
ning example, and QI-group 3 composed of Alice’s and Carol’s
tuples. In this case, two possible configurations c1 and c2 exist.
According to c1, Alice is the respondent of the tuple with
sensitive value BCM-pos, and Carol is the respondent of the
one with PNE-pos. According to c2, Alice is the respondent
of the tuple with PNE-pos, and Carol is the respondent of the
one with BCM-pos.
Each possible configuration cj is associated to a confidence
degree dj , that depends on the background knowledge of the
adversary. dj is computed as the sum of the probabilities, given
by RBKsv (or BKsv), of the single associations between
respondents and sensitive values in cj .
Given r ∈ R, and the set C of possible configurations, in
order to calculate PKsv(r, τi) = (p1, p2, . . . , pn) we need
to compute, for each pm ∈ {p1, p2, . . . , pn}, the sum of
the degree of confidence of every possible configuration in
which r is the respondent of a tuple having sensitive value
sm, divided by the sum of the degree of confidence of every
possible configuration:
pm =
∑
∀cj∈C: cj(t)=r∧t[S]=sm dj∑
∀cj∈C dj
.
Example 2: Continuing Example 1, according to RBKsv2
(Table III(b)), the degree of confidence for c1 is much higher
than the one for c2. Indeed, the probability of Alice being the
respondent of a tuple with sensitive value BCM-pos is 0.31,
which is also the probability of Carol being the respondent
of the other tuple; hence, d1 = 0.31 + 0.31 = 0.62 . The
probabilities regarding configuration c2 are much lower; i.e.,
0.05 and 0.02, respectively; i.e., d2 = 0.07. Hence, if pm is
the probability of Alice being the respondent of a tuple with
sensitive value BCM-pos, by applying the above formula we
obtain pm = 0.620.62+0.07 ' 0.9. The values of PKsv at τ2 are
shown in Table III(c).
However, in general the exact computation of PKsv is
intractable; indeed, if the cardinality of the QI-group is k, the
number of possible configurations is k!. For this reason, an
TABLE III
ADVERSARY’S POSTERIOR AND REVISED KNOWLEDGE
(a) PKsv at τ1
Name Ex-res p
Alice MAM-pos 0.5
Alice CX-neg 0.5
Betty MAM-pos 0.5
Betty CX-neg 0.5
Carol CX-pos 0.5
Carol BS-neg 0.5
Doris CX-pos 0.5
Doris BS-neg 0.5
(b) RBKsv at τ2
Name BCM-pos PNE-pos
Alice 0.31 0.05
Carol 0.02 0.31
(c) PKsv at τ2
Name Ex-res p
Alice BCM-pos 0.9
Alice PNE-pos 0.1
Carol BCM-pos 0.1
Carol PNE-pos 0.9
approximate algorithm is the natural candidate for the compu-
tation of posterior knowledge. In our experimental evaluation,
we calculate posterior knowledge by the Ω-estimate method
proposed by Li et al. [9].
C. Computing revised knowledge
In order to compute revised sensitive values background
knowledge at τi (i > 1) the adversary needs to calculate, for
each respondent r of a tuple in V ∗i , and for each sensitive
value s ∈ D[S], the marginal probability of r to be the
respondent of a tuple with private value s in V ∗i , given PK
sv
and BKseq . Let V∗ = 〈V ∗1 , V ∗2 , . . . , V ∗i−1〉 be the history of
released views containing a tuple of r, and Si the random
variable representing the sensitive value of r’s tuple released
at τi. Then, by applying the conditioning rule, we have:
P (Si) =
∑
λ∈Λ
(
BKseq(λ, T, r, τi) · P (λ)
)
,
where T = 〈τ1, τ2, . . . , τi−1〉, Λ is the set of possible se-
quences of sensitive values of r’s tuples released at T , and
P (λ) is the probability of sequence λ ∈ Λ. In particular,
given the sequence λ = 〈s1, s2, . . . , si−1〉, P (λ) is the joint
probability of the occurrence of each sj ∈ λ at τj based on
PKsv . If we denote as p(r, sj , τj) that probability according
to PKsv(r, τj), we have:
P (λ) =
∏
sj∈λ
(
p(r, sj , τj)
)
.
Example 3: Considering our running example, the adver-
sary revises his sensitive values background knowledge after
observing view V ∗1 to obtain RBK
sv
2 as follows. The prob-
ability p(Alice, s, τ1) that Alice is the respondent of a tuple
released at τ1 having sensitive value s is given by PKsv1
(Table III(a)). Moreover, we represent by p˜(BCM-pos | s) the
probability that an individual is the respondent of a tuple
released at τ2 with sensitive value BCM-pos provided that the
same individual was the respondent of a tuple released at τ1
with sensitive value s; this conditional probability is given by
BKseq (Table II(b)). Then, the marginal probability of Alice
to be the respondent of one tuple with BCM-pos at τ2 can be
calculated as:
p(Alice,BCM-pos, τ2) =
=
∑
∀s∈D[S]
(
p(Alice, s, τ1) · p˜(BCM-pos | s)
)
=
= p(Alice,MAM-pos, τ1) · p˜(BCM-pos |MAM-pos)+
+ p(Alice,CX-neg, τ1) · p˜(BCM-pos|CX-neg) =
= 0.5 · 0.6 + 0.5 · 0.02 = 0.31.
Conditioning over any possible private value s′ other than
MAM-pos and CX-neg is omitted from the above formula,
since the probability p(Alice, s′, τ1) according to PKsv1 is
0. Analogously, the adversary calculates that, according to
RBKsv2 , Alice has 0.05 probability to be the respondent of
a tuple with private value PNE-pos, while the probability
of Carol is 0.31 for PNE-pos, and 0.02 for BCM-pos (Ta-
ble III(b)).
V. JS-REDUCE DEFENSE
In this section we illustrate the JS-reduce defense against
the identified background knowledge attacks.
A. Defense strategy
In order to enforce anonymity, it is necessary to limit the
adversary’s capability of identifying the actual respondent of
a tuple in a given QI-group. Referring to the terminology
introduced in Section IV-B and to the attack we are consid-
ering, this means reducing the confidence of the adversary
in discriminating a configuration c˜ among the possible ones,
based on his knowledge RBKsv .
The goal of JS-reduce is to create QI-groups whose tuple re-
spondents have similar RBKsv (BKsv) distributions. Indeed,
if the respondents of tuples in a QI-group are indistinguishable
with respect to RBKsv (BKsv), the adversary cannot exploit
background knowledge to perform the attack. Of course, de-
fending against background knowledge attacks is not sufficient
to guarantee privacy protection against other kinds of attacks.
For this reason, JS-reduce also enforces k-anonymity and t-
closeness, in order to protect against well-known identity- and
attribute-disclosure attacks, respectively. Note that JS-reduce
can be easily extended to enforce additional privacy models.
B. Defending against sequential background knowledge at-
tacks
In order to measure the similarity of probability distribu-
tions RBKsv (BKsv), we adopt Jensen-Shannon divergence
(JS) [20]. With respect to other distance measures among
probability distributions, this function has three important
properties: i) it can be computed on a set of more than
two distributions; ii) it is always a definite number; iii) it is
symmetric with respect to the order of the arguments. Suppose
that P = {p1, . . . , pu} is a set of probability distributions
such that each element has form: pi = (pi1, . . . , p
i
s). Suppose
also that pi1, . . . , piu denote the weights of the probability
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distributions, and that
∑u
i=1 pi
i = 1. Then the JS divergence
among distributions in P is:
JS(P) = H(
u∑
i=1
pii · pi)−
u∑
i=1
pii ·H(pi),
where H(p) is the Shannon entropy of p = (p1, . . . , ps). In
our case, each pi corresponds to the background knowledge
about a tuple respondent; since this probability pi already
includes the adversary’s confidence, when we compute the
above formula we assign the same weight to each probability
distribution.
Given a required threshold j, the JS-reduce defense guar-
antees that, for each QI-group Q in an anonymized view, the
JS divergence of the set of probability distributions RBKsv
(BKsv) of respondents of tuples in Q is below j. Note that,
given the privacy preferences expressed by the data owner, the
actual value of threshold j must be chosen according to many
domain-specific factors, including the diversity of sensitive
values in released views, and background knowledge. Similar
considerations apply for the choice of the parameter k of k-
anonymity and t of t-closeness.
Clearly, in order to be effective against sequential back-
ground knowledge attacks, JS-reduce needs to calculate the
RBKsv distribution of respondents before anonymizing data.
Hence, similarly to the knowledge revision cycle presented
in Section IV, the defense technique (graphically illustrated
in Figure 2), performs posterior knowledge computation, and
sensitive values background knowledge revision. BKsv and
BKseq are obtained using one of the techniques illustrated in
Section IV-A.
C. The JS-reduce algorithm
The pseudo-code of the JS-reduce algorithm is shown in
Algorithm 1. The algorithm takes as input: i) a sequence
Hn = 〈V1, . . . , Vn〉 of original views; ii) the set R of
respondents of tuples in Hn, as well as their QI values; iii)
sensitive values background knowledge BKsv and sequential
background knowledge BKseq; iv) the minimum level k of
k-anonymity, threshold t of t-closeness, and threshold j of JS
divergence. It returns V ∗n , the generalization of Vn.
At first (lines 3 to 5), for each respondent of tuples in Hn,
RBKsv at τ1 is initialized according to BKsv . Then (lines 5
to 11), each view Vi in Hn is processed in turn, from V1 to
Vn. In particular, each Vi is generalized by the Generalize
procedure (line 6) in order to enforce thresholds j of JS
divergence, t of t-closeness, and minimum cardinality k. The
algorithm for generalization, specifically designed to preserve
Input: Sequence Hn = 〈V1, . . . , Vn〉, the set R of possible
respondents as well as their QI values, BKsv , BKseq , the
minimum level k of k-anonymity, threshold t of t-closeness,
threshold j of JS divergence.
Output: V ∗n
JS-reduce(Hn, R,BKsv , BKseq , k, t, j)1
begin2
forall r ∈ R do3
RBKsv1 (r)← BKsv(r)4
end5
for h = 1 to n do6
V ∗h ← Generalize(Vh, RBKsvh , t, j, k)7
forall r ∈ Rh do8
PKsvh (r)← PKComputation(V ∗h , RBKsvh , r)9
RBKsvh+1(r)← BKRevision(PKsv(r), BKseq , r)10
end11
end12
return V ∗n13
end14
Input: The anonymized release V ∗h , the set RBK
sv
h of revised
background knowledge for each respondent of a tuple in V ∗h ,
respondent r
Output: PKsvh (r)
PKComputation(V ∗h , RBK
sv
h , r)1
begin2
QI-group Q← Q′ ∈ V ∗h s.t. r is the respondent of one tuple in Q′3
C ← {cj | cj is a valid configuration for Q}4
forall cj ∈ C do5
confidence degree dj ← 06
forall r′ s.t. ∃t ∈ Q | cj(t) = r′ do7
t′ ← t | cj(t) = r′8
dj ← dj +RBKsvh (r′, t′[S])9
end10
end11
forall s ∈ D[S] do12
p(r, s)←
∑
∀cj∈C|cj(t)=r∧t[S]=s dj∑
cj∈C dj13
end14
PKsvh (r)← {p(r, s˜), ∀s˜ ∈ D[S]}15
return PKsvh (r)16
end17
Input: The set of posterior knowledge of respondent r
PKsv(r) = {PKsv1 (r), . . . , PKsvh (r)}, the available
sequential background knowledge BKseq , respondent r
Output: RBKsvh+1(r)
BKRevision(PKsv(r), BKseq , r)1
begin2
Λ← {λ = 〈s1, . . . , si〉 | sj is a possible sensitive value for r3
released at τj}
forall λ ∈ Λ do4
P (λ)← 15
forall sj ∈ λ do6
P (λ)← P (λ) · PKsvj (r, sj)7
end8
end9
forall s ∈ D[S] do10
p˜(s | λ) is the conditional probability given by BKseq11
p(s)←∑λ∈Λ p˜(s | λ) · P (λ)12
end13
RBKsvh+1(r)← {p(s), ∀s ∈ D[S]}14
return RBKsvh+1(r)15
end16
Algorithm 1: JS-reduce algorithm
the data quality, is described in detail in Section V-D. We call
V ∗i the generalization of Vi, and Ri the set of respondents
of tuples in V ∗i . After the generalization, for each respondent
Generalize(Vh, t, j, k)1
begin2
V ∗h = ∅3
forall v ∈ Vh do4
iv ← ComputeHilbertIndex(v)5
end6
V˜h ← OrderOnHilbertIndex(Vh)7
Q← ∅8
for v˜ = v1 to v|V˜h| do9
Q← Q ∪ v˜10
if |Q| ≥ k ∧ t-clos(Q) ≤ t ∧ js(Q) ≤ j then11
CreateQIG(Q)12
Q← ∅13
end14
end15
if Q 6= ∅ then16
Remove tuples v ∈ Q17
end18
return V ∗h19
end20
CreateQIG(Q)1
begin2
GeneralizeQIvalues(Q)3
V ∗h ← V ∗h ∪Q4
end5
Algorithm 2: Generalization procedure
in Ri, JS-reduce calculates the posterior knowledge (line 9)
and the revised sensitive values background knowledge (line
10) at τi+1. Finally (line 12), the generalized view V ∗n is
returned. Procedures PKComputation and BKRevision apply
the adversary inference mechanisms described in Section IV-B
and Section IV-C, respectively. As for other privacy-preserving
techniques (e.g., [1], [11]), it is possible that some tuples
cannot be arranged in any QI-group without violating some of
the privacy requirements. In this case, JS-reduce suppresses
those tuples. Experimental results, reported in Section VI,
show that the percentage of suppressed tuples is negligible.
For those domains in which suppression of tuples is not
acceptable, JS-reduce can be easily modified to enforce the
required thresholds by the insertion of counterfeit tuples.
D. Data quality-oriented generalization
Any anonymization technique based on QI generalization
needs to carefully consider the resulting data quality: the more
the QI values are generalized, the lower is the quality (and
utility) of released data. Hence, instead of adopting a general-
purpose anonymization framework such as Mondrian [21], we
devised an ad-hoc QI generalization technique for JS-reduce
to achieve better data quality. Note that finding the optimal
generalization of data that satisfies the privacy requirements
of JS-reduce (i.e., the one that minimizes QI generalization)
is an NP-hard problem; indeed, it is well known that even
optimal k-anonymous generalization is NP-hard [22]. For this
reason, we devised an approximate algorithm, whose pseudo-
code is shown in Algorithm 2. The Generalize procedure
receives as input: i) the original view Vh; ii) revised sensitive
values background knowledge at τh; iii) a minimum level k
of k-anonymity, threshold t of t-closeness and threshold j of
JS divergence. It returns V ∗h , the generalization of Vh.
As proposed in [23], in order to partition tuples in QI-
groups, the procedure exploits the Hilbert space-filling curves.3
For each tuple in Vh, function ComputeHilbertIndex (lines
4 to 6) computes its Hilbert index considering the multi-
dimensional space having the QI attributes as dimensions.
Then, tuples in Vh are re-ordered with respect to their Hilbert
index, obtaining an auxiliary list V˜h (line 7). The procedure
adds to a group Q a tuple from the ordered list V˜h, and checks
if the cardinality of the group is greater than the k-anonymity
threshold k, and if the t-closeness and JS divergence values of
that group are below thresholds t and j, respectively. Note that,
according to the Hilbert transformation, tuples with similar
QI values are close in the list V˜h, and respondents having
similar QI values are also likely to have similar probability
distributions according to BKsv . Hence, we achieve both of
our goals: i) it is likely to find groups of tuples satisfying
privacy constraints, and ii) we limit the generalization of QI
values. Then, if the required privacy constraints are satisfied,
a new QI-group is created (line 12) by procedure CreateQIG:
the QI values are substituted with intervals including the QI
values of each tuple; the same procedure is repeated with the
remaining tuples. Otherwise (if constraints are violated), the
next tuple in V˜h is added to the group until the constraints are
satisfied (line 10).
As explained in Section V, it may happen that a few tuples
cannot be grouped into a QI-group (line 16) during the first
phase. In the current version of the algorithm, those tuples are
suppressed in order to guarantee the privacy constraints in the
whole view. However, the algorithm can be easily modified to
apply other solutions; e.g., based on the creation of counterfeit
tuples.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section we present an experimental evaluation of
the privacy threats due to sequential background knowledge
attacks, and we compare our defense with other applicable
solutions, in terms of both privacy protection and data quality.
A. Experimental setup
To the best of our knowledge, all the datasets used for
experimental evaluation of proposed privacy defenses for serial
data publication were created from non-temporally charac-
terized sets of tuples, in which each tuple was randomly
assigned to a release. Clearly, these datasets are not realistic for
3A Hilbert space-filling curve is a function that maps a point in a multi-
dimensional space into an integer. With this technique, two points that are
close in the multi-dimensional space are also close, with high probability, in
the one-dimensional space obtained by the Hilbert transformation.
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Fig. 3. QI generalization
investigating the use that an adversary can make of temporal
correlations. The dataset used in our experiments has been
synthetically created based on domain knowledge extracted
from the medical literature; in particular, studies reported
in [16], [17], [18], [19]. Each of those papers provides the
probabilities that a specific disease evolves from one stage to
another based on the characteristics of the patient (age, gender
and weight) and on the past evolution of the disease. Based on
that information, we computed BKseq as the probability of a
patient performing an exam at τi to obtain a given result ex-resi
given a sequence of results of exams performed by that person
in the previous weeks. BKsv was calculated dividing age and
weight into 3 sub-intervals (each one containing 10 values),
and assigning different probability distributions to each of the
18 classes of users obtained combining age, weight and gender
values. The dataset has been made available from our group
and can be used to replicate our experiments, or as a testbed
for any research about sequential background knowledge4.
Experiments were performed on a history of 24 views, each
one containing 5,000 tuples. A total of 16,160 individuals
appear in at least one view of the history. Tuples in the
dataset represent the results of medical exams performed in
a given institute. One view per week is released, and each
view contains the records of exams performed during that
week. A tuple is composed of 3 QI attributes age, gender
and weight, and a sensitive attribute Ex-res. Age has values in
the interval [45, 74], gender in [1, 2], and weight in [60, 89].
The domain of Ex-res includes 17 different values associated
to stages of different diseases (5 stages of liver disease, 4 of
the HIV syndrome, 3 of Alzheimer, and 5 of sepsis), as well as
two sensitive values to describe the deceased and discharged
events.
Since our study is the first to consider the role of sequential
background knowledge in privacy-preserving data publishing,
a direct comparison with techniques specifically devoted to
protect against the identified threats was not possible. How-
ever, we performed experiments to compare JS-reduce with
state of the art privacy protection methods that are applica-
ble to our case: a) distinct l-diversity (each QI-group must
contain at least l tuples having different sensitive values),
b) t-closeness [24], and c) (B, t)-privacy [9]. We used the
Mondrian framework [21] to generalize the views in the
4http://webmind.dico.unimi.it/BKseq-dataset.zip
Input: History of original views Hr = 〈V1, . . . , Vr〉, a sequence of
sensitive values seq, and a sensitive value s.
Output: The conditional probability p(s|seq), which corresponds to
the frequency of sequence 〈seq, s〉 in Hr .
SPM(Hr, seq, s) begin1
for h = 1 to r do2
forall respondent u of a tuple in Vh do3
for j = h to 1 do4
seqj = seq. of past j sensitive values of u in Hh5
seqj .numOcc = seqj .numOcc+ 16
end7
end8
end9
if (seq.numOcc == 0) then return 010
else11
sequence = 〈seq, s〉12
return
sequence.numOcc
seq.numOcc13
end14
end15
Algorithm 3: SPM-BKseq extraction
history according to each of the latter methods, while we
used Algorithm 1 to apply the JS-reduce defense. Experiments
were performed on a 2.4GHz workstation with 4GB RAM.
The time required for anonymizing a view with the JS-reduce
algorithm varied from a few minutes to a maximum of 43
minutes, depending on the chosen privacy parameters; this
is an acceptable time since in many cases anonymization is
performed offline.
For each considered technique, we made experiments with
different values of the corresponding privacy parameters.
Figure 3 shows the average semiperimeter5 of QI-groups
generated by the different techniques using the values shown
in Table IV (bold numbers indicate the parameters used in the
following experiments). A smaller semiperimeter corresponds
to a better quality of released data.
B. Measuring the adversary gain of knowledge
In order to evaluate the privacy threat, we measured the gain
of knowledge when an adversary is able to exploit sequential
background knowledge. For a given generalized view V ∗i
released at τi containing N tuples, we measured the average
5The semiperimeter of a QI-group is the sum of the normalized lengths of
the interval of each QI value of tuples in it.
adversary gain ρ as follows:
ρ =
1
N
N∑
j=1
(
p(rj , sij , τi)−
m(sij )
|Qij |
1− m(sij )|Qij |
)
,
where: p(rj , sij , τi) is the value of posterior knowledge com-
puted based on background knowledge for respondent rj and
her actual private value sij at τi; Qij is the QI-group of V
∗
i
containing the tuple whose respondent is rj ; and m(sij ) is the
number of tuples t in Qij such that t[S] = sij . Intuitively, the
adversary gain represents the amount of information obtained
with the use of background knowledge with respect to a
privacy attack based only on the observation of the frequency
of sensitive values in the QI-group.
C. The role of adversary’s background knowledge
We performed experiments to evaluate the role of back-
ground knowledge on the privacy threats investigated in this
paper:
◦ Incrementally extracted knowledge IE-BKseq . Since it was
the subject of related studies (e.g., [7], [9]), the first kind
of background knowledge we consider is the one directly
extracted from the data to be released. IE-BKseq can be
calculated by applying sequential pattern mining (SPM)
techniques on the history of original (i.e., non-anonymized)
data; at each time τi, IE-BKseq is calculated based on Vi.
Since the size of the corpus is relatively small, we applied
a simple SPM algorithm, which is essentially based on a
frequency count of sequences appearing in the history. The
algorithm is illustrated in Algorithm 3.
◦ Mined knowledge SPM-BKseq . In practice, an adversary
may approximate BKseq by applying SPM techniques on
an external corpus of non-anonymized data. We created a
data corpus using the same model that we used to generate
our dataset; the corpus consists in a history of 24 views
containing 5,000 tuples each. SPM-BKseq was calculated
by applying Algorithm 3 to that corpus.
◦ Domain knowledge DK-BKseq . Since the dataset we used
was generated based on domain knowledge, in our exper-
iments DK-BKseq corresponds to the exact BKseq; i.e.,
it is the “best” knowledge that an adversary may have.
However, in general an adversary’s domain knowledge
may only approximate the exact BKseq . Hence, we also
considered another kind of domain knowledge, whose tem-
poral extent is limited to a number n of past observations.
We denote this knowledge as n-steps DK-BKseq , and we
consider n = 1, n = 2, and n = 3.
Figure 4 shows the adversary gain when views are
anonymized using existing techniques, and the adversary may
exploit the different kinds of sequential background knowl-
edge. Results show that existing techniques are not effective
against the attacks identified in this paper. Indeed, with each
kind of background knowledge, the adversary gain grows very
rapidly during the first 6/8 releases, exceeding the value of 0.4.
For each considered anonymization technique, the form
of background knowledge that determines the highest ad-
versary gain is full DK-BKseq , since in our experiments
it corresponds to the exact BKseq . Hence, we considered
approximate DK-BKseq in order to better evaluate the role of
domain knowledge. Results illustrated in Figures 5(a) and 5(b)
show that even attacks based on approximate DK-BKseq are
effective against existing anonymization techniques; attacks
exploiting 3-steps DK-BKseq are more successful than the
ones exploiting 2-steps and 1-step knowledge (we omit the
plot for t-closeness since it is analogous to the one for
(B, t)-privacy). Results also show that when the adversary
exploits only BKsv (i.e., when he performs a snapshot attack),
the gain of information with respect to an attack considering
only the frequency of sensitive values is negligible. The
descending shape of curves for the 1-step and snapshot attacks
is due to the fact that the background knowledge used by the
adversary tends to diverge from the one that generated the
data, having a different temporal characterization.
D. Effectiveness of the JS-reduce defense
Experimental results reported in Figure 5(c) show that,
when views are anonymized with the JS-reduce technique,
the adversary gain remains below 0.12, independently from
the length of the released history, and on the kind of domain
knowledge available to the adversary. This result shows that
JS-reduce significantly limits the inference capabilities of the
adversary with respect to the other techniques that lead to an
adversary gain higher than 0.5.
We performed other experiments to evaluate the effective-
ness of JS-reduce with different combinations of background
knowledge available to the defender and to the adversary,
respectively. In Figure 6(a), we considered the case in which
the defender has background knowledge DK-BKseq . In this
case, the defense is very effective, even when the adversary
has the same background knowledge as the defender. When the
adversary’s background knowledge is extracted from the data,
we observe that the adversary gain is lower. With the label
n-SPM-BKseq in Figure 6, we denote that the adversary’s
SPM-BKseq is extracted based on a history of 24 views
containing n tuples each. The adversary gain is lower with
smaller values of n, since the resulting SPM-BKseq is a
coarser approximation of the exact BKseq . The adversary gain
with incrementally extracted knowledge is comparable to the
one obtained with SPM-BKseq .
We also considered the unfortunate case in which the
adversary has more accurate background knowledge than the
defender. Results illustrated in Figures 6(b) and 6(c) show the
adversary gain when the defender’s background knowledge
is IE-BKseq and SPM-BKseq , respectively. As expected,
the more accurate the attacker’s background knowledge with
respect to the defender’s one, the more effective the attack.
However, results show that JS-reduce provides sensible privacy
protection even in the worst case; indeed, the adversary gain
always remains below 0.25. It is important to note that JS-
reduce is effective even when the defender has neither domain
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Fig. 4. Adversary gain vs different kinds of adversary’s BKseq
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Fig. 5. Adversary gain vs accuracy of adversary’s domain knowledge DK-BKseq
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Fig. 6. JS-reduce vs different kinds of adversary’s BKseq
knowledge, nor external data to derive background knowledge.
Indeed, even extracting background knowledge from the data
to be released, the adversary gain is low.
In order to study in more detail the effectiveness of JS-
reduce, we considered a further metric, named average ad-
versary confidence. We call adversary confidence regarding
respondent r at release τj the value of the posterior probability
PKsv(r, τj) computed by the adversary for the actual private
value of r at τj . The average adversary confidence about a
generalized view V ∗j is the average of the adversary confidence
regarding respondents of tuples in V ∗j . Figure 7 shows a
comparison among the considered privacy techniques in terms
of the adversary confidence with respect to the number of
observed anonymized views (attack and defense are based on
DK-BKseq). These results show that with our technique the
adversary confidence does not significantly grow with respect
to the length of the release history. On the contrary, with the
other techniques, after a few anonymized views have been
released, the adversary can predict with high confidence the
exact sensitive values of tuples respondents.
We also performed specific experiments to evaluate the
impact on privacy protection of the JS divergence threshold
for the JS-reduce defense. Results are illustrated in Figure 9;
as expected, the lower the JS threshold value, the lower the
adversary gain.
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E. Data utility
In order to evaluate data utility, we considered both general
utility measures, and accuracy of aggregate query answering.
General utility is evaluated in terms of two well-known
metrics: average semiperimeter, and Global Certainty Penalty
(GCP) [25] (a metric taking into account the level of general-
ization of QI values). Figure 3 shows the average semiperim-
eter of QI-groups generated by the considered techniques (JS-
reduce is based on DK-BKseq). As it can be seen, JS-reduce
outperforms the other techniques. These results are confirmed
by a comparison in terms of GCP (Figure 8(a)).
Then, we compared the utility of transaction data gener-
alized by the different techniques in terms of the precision
in answering aggregate queries (e.g., “count the number of
individuals in the table whose QI-values belong to certain
ranges”). Queries were randomly generated according to
different values of expected selectivity, i.e., expected ratio
of tuples to be returned by the query. For each value of
expected selectivity, 10, 000 random queries were evaluated.
The imprecision in query answering was calculated in terms of
the median error. The results reported in Figure 8(b) show the
superiority of JS-reduce with respect to the other techniques;
this result is due to the use of the data quality-oriented
generalization algorithm presented in Section V-D.
Finally, we evaluated the number of tuples that were sup-
pressed by JS-reduce in order to enforce the privacy require-
ments. Results show that a very few number of tuples were
suppressed; i.e., at most 12 (< 0.25%) at each release.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we demonstrated that the correlation of
sensitive values in subsequent data releases can be used as ad-
versarial background knowledge to violate users’ privacy. We
showed that an adversary can actually obtain this knowledge
by different methods. Since serial release of transaction data
is a common situation, the considered problem poses a very
practical challenge. We proposed a defense algorithm based
on Jensen-Shannon divergence, and we showed through an
extensive experimental evaluation that other applicable solu-
tions are not effective, while our JS-reduce defense provides
strong privacy protection and good data quality, even when
the adversary has more accurate background knowledge than
the defender.
Future work includes studying the effect on privacy preser-
vation of compromised tuples; i.e., possibly very few tuples
whose respondent is known to the adversary. Moreover, spe-
cific application domains (e.g., streaming data) often require
anoymization to be performed online; hence, a further line of
investigation consists in devising protection techniques having
very low computational complexity.
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